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Test Data Generation for Stateful Network Protocol Fuzzing
Using a Rule-Based State Machine
Rui Ma , Daguang Wang, Changzhen Hu, Wendong Ji, and Jingfeng Xue
Abstract: To improve the efficiency and coverage of stateful network protocol fuzzing, this paper proposes a new
method, using a rule-based state machine and a stateful rule tree to guide the generation of fuzz testing data. The
method first builds a rule-based state machine model as a formal description of the states of a network protocol.
This removes safety paths, to cut down the scale of the state space. Then it uses a stateful rule tree to describe
the relationship between states and messages, and then remove useless items from it. According to the message
sequence obtained by the analysis of paths using the stateful rule tree and the protocol specification, an abstract
data model of test case generation is defined. The fuzz testing data is produced by various generation algorithms
through filling data in the fields of the data model. Using the rule-based state machine and the stateful rule tree,
the quantity of test data can be reduced. Experimental results indicate that our method can discover the same
vulnerabilities as traditional approaches, using less test data, while optimizing test data generation and improving
test efficiency.
Key words: fuzzing; stateful network protocol; test data generation; rule-based state machine; stateful rule tree
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Introduction

With the rapid development of network technology,
vulnerability discovery in stateful network protocols
has already become a research focus in the field of
information security. At present, the main vulnerability
discovery and analysis technology of stateful network
protocols include manual testing, patch comparison,
static analysis, dynamic analysis, fuzzing, etc.[1, 2]
Fuzzing is one of the most effective vulnerability
discovery technologies. It is a method for discovering
faults in software by providing unexpected input and
monitoring exceptions[3] . Many of the vulnerabilities
published by security organizations at home and abroad
were discovered through fuzzing.
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Fuzzing plays an important role in the field of
security testing of network protocols. But for stateful
network protocols that have complex interactions and
state transitions, test data generated by most general
fuzzing methods do not achieve effective coverage of
stateful trajectories. This seriously limits test efficiency
and coverage.
For test data generation in stateful network protocol
fuzzing, we propose a method based on a rule-based
state machine and a stateful rule tree, so that the
generated test data achieve high, targeted, and efficient
coverage. Combining the ideas of traditional fuzzing
methods with the characteristics of stateful network
protocols, this method presents the concept of rulebased state machine and stateful rule tree to cut down
the scale of state space. The rule-based state machine
provides a formal description, and the stateful rule tree
describes the relationship between states and messages
for the stateful network protocol. According to a
message sequence obtained by an analysis of paths, an
abstract data model, which is a template for generating
test data, is created. All instances of the abstract data
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models constitute the final test set.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the characteristics and security
testing of stateful network protocols, as well as the
defects in current approaches. Section 3 introduces
the details of test data generation using a rule-based
state machine and a stateful rule tree, and Section 4
presents our experimental process and results in terms
of a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). We conclude the
paper in Section 5.

2
2.1

Related Work
Characteristics of stateful network protocols

According to their context, network protocols can
usually be divided into stateful and stateless. Most
application-layer protocols are stateful.
In a stateful network protocol, multiple message
interactions occur when a logical function needs to be
performed, and while a context needs to be created
according to its last state. Stateful network protocols
therefore have certain characteristics:
(1) Complexity of communication. A complete
interaction process usually includes a handshake,
permissions validation, etc.
(2) Relevancy in context. In the process of message
processing, not only the attributes of the current state
but also the entire state trajectory before the current
state are needed.
(3) Good transaction semantics. Each stage of
complex requests in a stateful network protocol is
divided into several sub-stages. The interactions of
the sub-stages describe the process of a complete
transaction.
(4) State transition. Depending on the message types
being processed, the protocol can switch to different
states while receiving or sending messages. State
transition usually leads to a state space explosion
during test data generation for stateful network protocol
fuzzing.
2.2

Security testing of stateful network protocols

Research on security testing of stateful network
protocol has achieved some results. Banks et al.[4]
implemented a stateful network protocol fuzzer named
SNOOZE, and described a method that can effectively
identify vulnerabilities.
This method allows the
tester to describe a state operation of the protocol
and the messages that need to be created in that
state. Abdelnur et al.[5] proposed a fuzzer named
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KIF for stateful SIP, and discussed the usage of
detecting vulnerabilities caused by software failures.
Raniwala et al.[6] presented a testing method called
LRTP for stateful transport protocols. Alrahem et al.[7]
proposed INTERSTATE, which is a fuzzer for stateful
SIP. Yu[8] used a protocol description language to
describe the format of a network protocol so that
the generated test data can be effective. Kitagawa et
al.[9] presented a fuzzer called AspFuzz for application
layer protocols. AspFuzz can automatically generate
an attack message and then discover vulnerabilities
aimed at some error messages that ignore protocol
states and message sequences. Akbar and Faroop[10]
proposed a security framework for Real-time Transport
Protocol (RTP) fuzzing called RTP-miner. Gorbunov
and Rosenbloom[11] designed a fuzzing framework
based on an open-source framework, AutoFuzz. This
framework constructs a finite-state machine for network
protocols to extract protocol specifications, and guides
test data generation. Li et al.[12] put forward a method
that automatically identifies a variety of network
protocols and generates a fuzzer for vulnerability
discovery. Sui et al.[13] introduced a method that
combines stochastic signal processing with regular
expressions to guide test data generation, and then does
fuzzing to test the protocol robustness. Tsankov et al.[14]
implemented a lightweight fuzzer, SECFUZZ, which
is designed for stateful encrypted network protocols
and uses mutation rules to guide fuzz testing data
generation. Seo et al.[15] presented a stateful ruletree algorithm for stateful network protocol fuzzing,
which generates test sequences by mapping each state
and SIP grammar rules. Pan et al.[16] proposed a
model-based testing method for network protocols.
Using the protocol specification, the method builds
up a formal model for input data, constructs the
corresponding syntax tree for selected test nodes, and
then uses these nodes to guide test data generation. Ma
et al.[17] presented a fuzzing data generation method
for network protocols using a classification tree and
heuristic operators to reduce the quantity of test data.
2.3

Defects of stateful network protocol fuzzing

Although network protocol fuzzing has been widely
used with different kinds of network protocols and
related software products, and can effectively discover
some vulnerabilities, it has some deficiencies.
First, it lacks support for state information. Owing
to the characteristics of stateful network protocols, not
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only each state, but also the entire state trajectory,
should be considered in test data generation. Because
the context information and all states of a message
sequence are not included in traditional fuzzing,
generated test data for each state are discrete,
and cannot cover the full state trajectory. Thus,
vulnerabilities in state transitions may not be detected.
Second, there are a lot of redundant test data. Test
data are generated randomly without rules; as a result,
most test data are neglected by the target protocol.
Finally, most methods have a lack of specificity and
over-reliance on manual operations. In order to reduce
the redundant test data, specifications defined by testers
are required in some fuzzers. Although this method
might decrease the blindness of test data generation, it is
too dependent on testers, and may lead to low coverage
and incomplete testing.

3
3.1

Test Data Generation on the Basis of RuleBased State Machines
Overview

Focusing on the characteristics of stateful network
protocols, as well as on defects in test data generation
for traditional stateful network protocol fuzzing, this
paper presents a new method for test data generation
based on a rule-based state machine and a stateful rule
tree. The main steps of the method are as follows[18] :
Step 1: Obtain the specification of a target network
protocol, and then get protocol rules and a preliminary
rule-based state machine through analyzing the protocol
format.
Step 2: To generate a simplified state machine,
remove the safety paths by using the preliminary rulebased state machine model and protocol rules.
Step 3: Generate the stateful rule tree, which
combines state and rule information, according to
the protocol rules and the rule-based state machine
model. Then simplify the relationship between states
and messages by using the stateful rule tree so as to
remove the meaningless state–message combinations.
Step 4: Analyze all state–message paths according to
the stateful rule tree, and obtain an abstract data model
of test cases. Then generate initial test cases, including
the state trajectory, messages for each state, and a series
of state trajectories.
Step 5: Mutate initial test cases regularly with a
data generation algorithm to generate a large number
of test cases, which have the same state–message path
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but different values from the initial ones; then form the
final set of test data.
The rule-based state machine model and the stateful
rule tree are key points of the proposed method. The
rule-based state machine model is for the storage of
state information and the stateful rule tree is for the
storage of message paths.
3.2

Rule-based state machine

The finite state machine is an appropriate formal
description method for describing the state transitions
of network protocols. Focusing on the characteristics
of stateful network protocols, and combining them with
requirements of fuzz testing data generation, this paper
designs a rule-based state machine model for storing
information of each state.
A rule-based state machine model can be represented
by a 6-tuple RM D < S0 , S, I , O, F , V >, where:
S0 represents the initial state, which is the start of the
entire state space.
S represents all states of the entire state space.
I represents the set of formats of input data. Each Ik
of the set represents the format of the k-th input data
unit, where k is greater than or equal to 0, but less than
the total quantity of tuples.
O represents the set of formats of output data unit.
Each Ok of the set represents the format of the k-th
output data unit, where k is greater than or equal to 0,
but less than the total quantity of tuples.
F is the state transition function that indicates the
migration relations of states.
V represents the protocol state rules. It contains all
attributes that indicate the characteristics of states, such
as authentication ID, cookies, and others. A detailed
description of V depends on the protocol specification.
The rule-based state machine is an effective
theoretical formal description model for describing
the stateful network protocol so as to store state and
trajectory information of the target protocol. It not
only describes the characteristics of states, but also can
construct the state space using the rules, and optimize
the state trajectory.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are two state trajectories in
the state space: S0 ! S1 ! S3 and S0 ! S2 ! S3 .
Assume that there is a generation rule: if no exception
occurs in the transition from one state to another,
then this state trajectory is safe. The safety trajectory
is meaningless for test data generation, so it can be
ignored, to reduce the scale of the state space. Suppose
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Si

message1
Fig. 1

Original state space.

that the path S0 ! S2 ! S3 is a safety trajectory, the
reduced state space is shown in Fig. 2.
3.3

sub-message1

Stateful rule tree

The stateful rule tree is a hierarchical tree based on the
rule-based state machine and the protocol specification.
It is represented by a 7-tuple T D < S, M , Sub, H , F1 ,
F2 , F3 > as the formal description, where:
S represents the set of states that indicates the state
space of the stateful network protocol.
M represents the set of messages that contains all
protocol messages specified in the stateful network
protocol.
Sub represents the set of sub-messages that contains
all protocol sub-messages specified in the stateful
network protocol. In the stateful protocol specification,
a message usually consists of several sub-messages.
H represents the set of message headers that includes
all the message headers in the stateful network protocol.
F1 D S  M , which represents the mapping
relationship between states and messages.
F2 D M  Sub, which represents the mapping
relationship between messages and sub-messages.
F3 D Sub H , which represents the mapping
relationship between sub-messages and message
headers.
The structure of the stateful rule tree is shown in
Fig. 3. The first layer is the rule-based state machine
of the protocol. The second layer is the message
communication for each specific state, and indicates the
received and sent message types under that state. The
third layer is the specific messages that contain requests,
confirmations, and so on. The fourth layer is message
headers that contain some attribute fields. If necessary,
you can also define sub-fields for the attribute fields in
the fifth layer.
The stateful rule tree represents the correlation
between states and messages. There is a path between
S and M if and only if receiving or sending message

Fig. 2

message2

State space after removing safety paths.

sub-message2

message
header1
Fig. 3

message
header2

Structure of stateful rule tree.

M is possible under state S , which means there is
correlation between S and M . No path exists between
S and M if and only if receiving or sending message
M is impossible under state S, which means there is
no correlation between S and M . For example, we
could build a stateful rule tree as shown in Fig. 4 if
sending message2 is impossible but receiving message1
is possible under the state.
The stateful rule tree shows the relationship between
state combinations and messages. With this relationship
description, we can remove meaningless test data
quickly so as to generate more effective test data and
furthermore prevent a state space explosion. Moreover,
with an appropriate heuristic searching algorithm, we
can also remove meaningless test data under a specific
state to make the fuzzing more effective.
3.4

Generating abstract data models for test cases

The abstract data model for test case is the template of
test data generation. It specifies the data format of test
cases, as well as message sequence of testing.
The generation process for the abstract data model:
Assume that there is a simplified rule-based state
machine of a stateful network protocol (shown in Fig.
5). Three states of this state machine are state0, state1,
and state2. The transition between states depends on
received messages. Table 1 shows the state–message
paths.
Table 1 shows three state–message paths from
state0 to state2. The three paths correspond to three

Fig. 4

Example of state rule tree.
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message4

state0

state1
message1

Fig. 5
Table 1
No.
1
2
3

message2 /
message3

state2

Simplified state space.
State-message paths.

Path
state0! message1! state1! message2! state2
state0! message1! state1! message3! state2
state0! message4 ! state2

abstract data models of test cases, namely message1!
message2, message1! message3, and message4.
According to the network protocol specification,
we can determine the message format to obtain the
test data model (Fig. 6) after the message sequence
is determined. Figure 6 indicates that the message
sequence consists of message1 and message2. Each
message is made up of several fields, and each field
represents a protocol attribute constrained with rules
like data type, length, and so forth.
3.5

Generating test data

A test dataset is an instance of an abstract data
model. An abstract data model can generate several test
datasets. We can use different kinds of data-generation
algorithms to generate the instance.
The collection of test data generated by all abstract
data models is the final test dataset.

4

Experiment and Evaluation

In order to evaluate the method we proposed in Section
3, we selected the SIP as a target protocol and
the Sulley[19] as a fuzzer, and we implemented the
fuzz testing data generation method using the rulebased state machine and stateful rule tree for the

Fig. 6

Example of abstract data model for test case.

stateful network protocol on the Sulley. Test data was
generated by the method provided in the Sulley and our
method, respectively. In addition to the correctness of
discovering vulnerability, we evaluated the amount of
generated test data and testing execution time.
4.1

Experimental environment

Experiments were done under Windows 7. First, we
take the Sulley as the fuzzer. Then we implemented
the new test data generation method with rule-based
state machines based on the Sulley. The target protocol
focuses on the SIP, and we selected officeSIP server 3.1
as our testing target.
4.2

Generating test data for the SIP

The four main transaction states in the SIP are the
INVITE transaction state of a client, non-INVITE
transaction state of a client, INVITE transaction state
of the server, and non-INVITE transaction state of the
server. In this paper, our focus is mainly on analysis of
the INVITE transaction state of the server.
4.2.1

Constructing a rule-based state machine for
the SIP

According to RFC3261[20] , the four states in the
INVITE server of SIP are Running, Completion,
Confirmation, and Termination. As shown in Fig. 7,
there are some state transitions while sending and
receiving messages.
For the states and characteristics of the SIP, we define
the rule-based state machine model as RM D < S0 , S ,
I , O, F , V >, where:
S0 DfRunningg;
S D fRunning; Completion; Confirmation; TerminationgI

Fig. 7

Transaction state machine of INVITE server.
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I DfINVITE, 1xx-6xx, ACKg;
O DfACK, timeout, transfer errorg;
F DfRunning!Running,Completion!Completion,
Running!Completion,Confirmation!Confirmation,
Completion!Confirmation,Confirmation!Termination,
Running!Termination,Completion!Terminationg;
V represents the protocol state rules.
The rule-based state machine of the SIP is
constructed as follows: the server enters the Running
state when it receives an INVITE request, and transfers
to the Completion state when it receives a 300–699
response. If the connection is established successfully
during the Completion state, the server will receive an
ACK message, and then move into the Confirmation
state. Otherwise, the server will directly move into
the Termination state. If the server receives a timeout
during the Confirmation state or Running state, then it
directly moves into the Termination state.
If there is no exception caused by unsafe data from
the Completion state to the Termination state , or from
the Confirmation state to the Termination state, we mark
these two paths as safety paths that should be removed.
The simplified rule-based state machine of SIP is shown
in Fig. 8.

H D fcallid, HCOLON, from-spec,
accept-range, . . . g;
F1 D fRunning ! INVITE, Running ! ACK,
Running ! 1xx, . . . , Running ! 6xx,
Completion!INVITE, Completion!ACK,
Completion ! 1xx, . . . , Completion ! 6xx,
Confirmation ! INVITE,
Confirmation ! ACK, . . . g;
F2 D fINVITE ! Call-ID, INVITE ! From,
ACK! Accept, ACK ! Call-ID,
ACK ! From, . . . g;
F3 D fCall-ID!callid, Call-ID!HCOLON,
From! from-spec, From ! HCOLON,
Accept! HCOLON,
Accept!accept-range, . . . g.
As shown in Fig. 9, since sending a response message
like 1xx-6xx is impossible in the Confirmation state, the
sub-tree on the right of Confirmation is meaningless,
and should be removed. Because no messages will be
received or sent in the Termination state, the tree has
only the Termination state as its root node. According
to the above rules, Fig. 10 shows the new pruned state
rule tree, based on the one shown in Fig. 9.
The stateful rule tree combines protocol states and
protocol
rules to make pruning possible. After pruning
4.2.2 Building a stateful rule tree for SIP
the stateful rule tree, large numbers of meaningless
Based on the formal definition of a stateful rule tree, we
combinations are removed, and thus prevented from
build up the stateful rule tree for SIP as shown in Fig. 9.
generating too much invalid test data. Therefore, the
The stateful rule tree of SIP is described as a 7-tuple
stateful rule tree acts as an effective means for test data
T D < S, M , Sub, H , F1 , F2 , F3 >, where:
S D fRunning; Completion; Confirmation; TerminationgI generation.
4.2.3 Generating an abstract data model for test
M D fINVITE, ACK, 1xx, . . . , 6xx, . . . g;
case
Sub DfCall-ID, From, Accept, . . . g;
With the stateful rule tree shown in Fig. 10, we obtain
ten state–message paths, some of which are listed in
Table 2. For example, Path1 represents the situation

Running

Completion

INVITE

ACK

Call-ID

callid

Fig. 8

Simplified rule-based state machine of SIP.

Fig. 9

Confirmation

HCOLON

Ă

100

Ă

From

from-spec

Termination

699

Accept

Ă

accept-range

Stateful rule tree of SIP before pruning.
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Running

Completion

Confirmation

Termination

the experimental results of the Sulley method and our
method in terms of vulnerability discovery, the quantity
of generated test data, and testing execution time.
4.3.1

INVITE

ACK

Call-ID

callid

Fig. 10

Path2
Path3
Path4

from-spec

699

Accept

Ă

accept-range

Stateful rule tree of SIP after pruning.

Table 2
Name
Path1

Ă

From

HCOLON

Ă

100

Some state–message paths of SIP.

Path
INVITE ! Running ! 300–699 ! Completion !
ACK ! Confirmation
INVITE ! Running ! 200–299 ! Termination
INVITE ! Running ! 100–199 ! Running !
200–299 ! Termination
INVITE ! Running ! 100–199 ! Running !
300–699 ! Completion ! ACK ! Confirmation

in which the server enters the Running state when it
receives an INVITE request. The server then enters the
Completion state when it receives an ACK message.
At this point the path ends. The state–message paths
determine the sequence of messages. For instance,
the message sequence INVITE ! 300-699! ACK is
obtained according to Path1.
After determining the sequence of messages,
and according to the message rules of SIP given
in Ref. [15], we define the data format of each
message. For example, the rule of the callid field in
the INVITE message is “callid: (# ASCII #
{1,50} (|@(|w|*) {1,32}).?)”, where “#
ASCII # {1,50}” indicates that the field uses
ASCII encoding, as well as that its length is greater
than 1 byte and less than 50 bytes.
The data format of messages determines the abstract
data model for test case. Moreover, an instance of the
abstract data model is a test data, and the collection of
test data generated by all abstract data models is the
final test dataset.
4.3

Vulnerability discovery

The capability of discovering vulnerability is one of
the important factors for evaluating the effectiveness of
fuzz testing data generation approaches. Table 3 shows
a comparison of vulnerability information before and
after the improvement. The third column means that
all results were obtained using the Sulley method, and
the fourth column means that all results are obtained
using our generation method, implemented through
modification of the Sulley approach.
Table 3 indicates that both the Sulley and our
method detected one vulnerability at the time of the
officeSIP server 3.1 testing. This vulnerability was
published by the China National Vulnerability Database
of Information Security, as well as in the Common
Vulnerabilities & Exposures. It is a kind of remote
denial-of-service vulnerability, and is due to an error
when handling “To” headers in SIP requests. With
a specially crafted SIP INVITE request containing an
incomplete recipient address in the “To” header, a
remote attacker can cause the server to crash, resulting
in a loss of availability[21] .
The results show that the same number of
vulnerabilities was detected before and after the
improvement, and our method achieves the same
capability of discovering vulnerability as the Sully.
4.3.2

Fuzzing efficiency

The efficiency of fuzzing focuses on the quantity of test
data and the testing execution time. Table 4 shows a
comparison before and after our improvement.
(1) Test data quantity
The quantity of generated test data illustrates the
Table 3
Vulnerability
name

Vulnerability
No.

OfficeSIP Server
Input Validation
Vulnerability

CNNVD-201202-145/
CVE-2012-1008

Table 4

Experimental evaluation

In order to verify the test data generation of the
stateful network protocol fuzzing using a rule-based
state machine and a stateful rule tree, we compared

Effectiveness of test data.

Sulley
Our method

Discovering
vulnerability
Our
Sulley
method
Yes

Yes

Fuzzing efficiency.

Test data quantity
14 247
11 641

Testing execution time
15 h 31 min
12 h 52 min

Rui Ma et al.: Test Data Generation for Stateful Network Protocol Fuzzing Using a Rule-Based State Machine

effect of state-space pruning. The data indicates that our
method generates test data that is 81.71% the quantity
of the Sulley, this also demonstrates that our method can
effectively reduce the state space. The reason is that the
Sulley adopts a pre-generated approach for generating
test data, and cannot generate specific test data for
different testing targets. This results in redundant test
data. Our method uses a rule-based state machine
model and a stateful rule tree to remove safety paths to
reduce the scale of the state space, as well as removing
useless states and messages. This makes our method
more intelligent, and thus able to reduce the quantity of
redundant data.
(2) Testing execution time
The test efficiency is represented as the number of
vulnerabilities divided by the testing execution time.
Thus for a given number of vulnerabilities, if the testing
execution time is shorter, the test efficiency is higher.
The data in Table 4 indicates that execution time was
reduced 2 hours and 39 minutes using our method, when
the Sulley and our method have the same vulnerability
discovery capability.
In short, the experimental results highlight that our
method could not only guarantee the capability of
discovering vulnerabilities, but also reduce the quantity
of generated test data and the testing execution time.
This proves that our method can scale down the
state space of a stateful network protocol as well as
optimize the combinations of states and messages. With
the optimization, the test dataset of stateful network
protocol fuzzing can achieve more efficiency.

5

to verify the correctness of vulnerability discovery, the
quantity of test data, and the testing execution time. The
experimental results reveal that our method could not
only guarantee vulnerability discovery, but also reduce
the quantity of test data and decrease testing execution
time.
Our research work still exhibits some defects. For
example, the verification is not adequate. We need
to select more protocols, especially privacy protocols
whose specifications could not be made available.
Future work will also be on how to extract rules from
protocols.
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